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In my opinion it cannot be denied but that your discourse carries with it much of 
probability, arguing, as we say, ex suppositione, namely, granting that the Earth 
moves with the two motions assigned it by Copernicus; but, if one excludes those 
motions, all that you have said is vain and invalid; and for the exclusion of that 
hypothesis, it is very manifestly hinted by your discourse itself.’ 
THUS speaks Simplicio to Salviati in Galileo’s Dialogue on the Great World 
Systems. Simplicio continues with what he believes to be conclusive arguments 
against the Copernican system. If, for example, the Earth rotates, surely one 
consequence is that we would feel strong winds as we move through the air, 
which Simplicio assumes would remain stationary while the Earth moves. 
Since we don’t feel these winds, the antecedent supposition must be false, 
according to Simplicio. Therefore, it follows that the Earth does not move. 
To the uninitiated, then, it appears that Simplicio is here accusing Salviati of 
reasoning ex suppositione from an unconvincing (indeed, false) hypothesis, 
which would seem to be easily disproved. According to Donald W. Mertz, 
however, this is not the case. Simplicio’s remark is simply a muddled reference 
to Galileo’s standard argument ex suppositione, which, according to Mertz’ 
analysis, conclusively demonstrates verae causae, and which any sophisticated 
reader of that time would understand.2 Hence, it is not even necessary for 
Salviati to point this out. He simply goes on to other arguments which, 
hopefully, the slow-witted Aristotelian will comprehend better. 
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According to Mertz’ interpretation, Galileo’s ‘standard method of ex 
suppositione’ goes as follows: 
If, if on the supposition of D, then D is proven related as a cause to C, and C 
obtains, then D.3 
In this example, C stands for the phenomena of Mediterranean tides and D for 
the Copernican interpretation of the motions of the Earth. Mertz argues that, 
correctly understood, this is a valid deduction of the Copernican hypothesis by 
a method stemming from Aquinas, Buridan and others. The argument for 
validity is based on a number of assumptions. One involves use of the medieval 
method of resolution and composition. Another is Galileo’s argument that if 
the Earth moves, this can be shown to be the efficient cause of the tides. But 
there is a rather gaping hole in Mertz’ reconstruction. Let D be the statement: 
‘There are demons who can and desire to produce diseases’, and C the 
statement: ‘There are diseases’. By Mertz’ version of argument ex supposit- 
ione, we have here a proof that there are demons who cause diseases, a 
proposition which most scholars would regard as patently false, or, at best, 
nonsense. 
If, however, for the sake of argument, we fix the last difficulty by 
stipulating natural causes, and we accept the rest of Mertz’ assumptions, there 
still remain three major difficulties with this interpretation of Galileo’s 
method of arguing ex suppositione. 
I. This method is assumed to be widely known by Galileo’s readers; 
however, the literature on ex suppositione has yet to supply a single reference 
to any general discussion of the method by Galileo, his disciples, or other 
contemporaries. References to this method in Galileo are exclusively to what 
are supposed to be instances of its use, as illustrated by the above 
interpretation of the passage quoted from the Dialogue. 
II. The illustrative instances, offered by Mertz, turn out to be less than 
compelling evidence for the existence of this supposed method. The above 
quoted passage in the Dialogue is a typical example. Why should we believe 
that Simplicio’s own interpretation of Salviati’s argument - that it is derived 
from a false hypothesis - is incorrect and that Simplicio has simply 
misunderstood a more recondite meaning that is so well known that this 
misunderstanding of it requires no correction, or even comment, by Salviati? 
Similar difficulties attend the rest of the instances used to document the 
existence of this method in Galileo’s writings. 
III. There are other instances, not discussed by the proponents of this 
interpretation, in which Galileo uses the expression ex suppositione, both in 
the vernacular and in the formal Latin, and in such manner as strongly to 
3Mertz, op. cit., p. 118. 
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suggest a quite different - and simpler - interpretation, while those instances 
which are put forth in support of this suppositious thesis can be shown to have 
been misunderstood. 
To elaborate on point I, the absence of general discussion of a special 
method of ex suppositione in Galileo’s time, this is particularly surprising in 
view of the Renaissance obsession with method.4 Supposing there was a 
recognized method of argument ex suppositione, as reconstructed from 
Galileo’s writings, it is very odd that there should be no general and readily 
available discussion in the literature. It is particularly strange that Galileo, 
who was not reticent in such matters, never explains this supposedly very 
crucial method of his. Surely, he would have thought to give it as much 
attention as he did, say, the method of analysis and synthesis, which he 
discusses in several places, even though he doesn’t use it much except in his 
mathematical proofs, as in the Greek tradition.5 Finally, why is argument ex 
suppositione not a prominent matter of discussion by Galileo’s disciples? Is it 
mentioned at all? This is rather suspicious. So far, no proponent of the theory 
of a well known method of ex suppositione in the 17th century has provided a 
single reference to any general discussion of the method in that period. They 
give us only a few occurrences of the expression which, under duress, are made 
to yield their supposed meanings. 
On point II - the uncompelling nature of the instances cited by Mertz and 
others to show that ex suppositione, as defined by these authors, was Galileo’s 
standard method of apodictic argument - it should be noted that most of the 
examples discussed in the literature are from his later writings. In Galileo’s De 
motu antiquiora, however, which was composed fairly early,6 there are a 
number of instances where the term suppositio is used to refer to an arbitrary 
‘See Neal Gilbert, Renaissance Concepts of Method (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1960). Pioneering work was done by many others, much of it in the nineteenth century. See 
Gilbert’s extensive bibliography. On Galileo, see, especially, J. H. Randall, Jr., ‘The Development 
of Scientific Method in the School of Padua’, Journal of the History of Ideas I (1940), 
pp. 177-206. 
‘See my ‘New Science of Motion: A study of Galileo’s De motu locali’, Archive for History of 
Exact Sciences 13, Nos 2 and 3, pp. 103 - 306, 117 - 119, especially n. 5, and section 6.4. Randall’s 
claims for the method of analysis and synthesis in Galileo’s work stimulated my investigation of 
Galileo’s method, and this in turn led me to study his so-called frummenti, a selection of notes 
from his manuscript on motion (Galileo Manuscript 72, at the Eibfioteca Nuzionale in Florence). 
After completing this study of the De motu locali, from which it appeared that the method of 
analysis and synthesis did not, in fact, play a prominent role in Galileo’s work, I returned to an 
earlier draft which examined Galileo’s method in all of his published (and some unpublished) 
writings. The fruit of this labor was ‘Galileo’s Scientific Method: A Reexamination’, in New 
Perspectives on Galileo, R. E. Butts and J. C. Pitt (eds.) (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1978). pp. 1 - 57. 
A few results appeared earlier in my ‘Galileo Revisited: an Essay Review of Galileo’s Intellectual 
Revolution: Middle Period, 1610- 1632’, in Historia Mathematics 3 (1976), 103. 
“Opere I, pp. 251- 340. These writings are generally thought to date from Galileo’s years at 
Pisa, with perhaps some composed during his first years at Padua. 
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assumption which may be false, and, in at least one instance, we find the 
expression ex suppositione where the reference is to a supposition made in 
order to demonstrate (by reductio ad absurdum) that it is false.’ The latter 
usage is rare in Galileo’s writings, whereas the former - employment of an 
unproved, or unprovable, suppositio that may be false - is more frequent. 
This usage remains unchanged in Galileo’s later writings, including those 
which have been cited in support of the thesis Mertz defends in his paper: that 
Galileo used a method of arguing ex suppositione that produced rigorous 
demonstration of true conclusions. Let us look at four of these instances. The 
first is in the introduction to the second book of De motu locali,* on naturally 
accelerated motion. Referring explicitly to Archimedes, Galileo speaks of 
those who have derived spiral and conchoidal lines ex suppositione from 
certain motions that are not found in nature, and he contrasts with this 
procedure the one he will follow: 
. . . anyone may invent an arbitrary type of motion and discuss its properties (thus, 
for instance, some have imagined spiral or conchoidal lines, generated by certain 
motions, and have commendably established their properties arguing ex supposit- 
ione, although these motions do not occur in nature), but we have decided to 
consider the phenomena of bodies falling with an acceleration such as actually 
occurs in nature.. . .9 
The De motu locali is to be based on a definition of naturally accelerated 
motion as it occurs in nature. This definition (proportionality of velocity to 
time in free fall) was found through long reflection, according to Galileo, and 
the properties demonstrated from it are seen to correspond to and coincide 
with those properties which ‘naturalia experimenta show to the senses’.‘O 
Galileo speaks here of nature acting in the simplest, most evident way, and he 
concludes that we will not depart from right reason (recta ratione) if we accept 
his definition. 
The definition is then stated formally, after which it is supported by several 
arguments. These follow from the principle of simplicity, from experience, 
and from argument that the most plausible alternative (that acquired velocity 
‘Opere I, p. 265. 
8This is the title of Galileo’s treatise on motion which is included as the terza giornata of 
Discorsi e dimostrazioni matematiche intorno h due nuove scienze, Opere VIII, pp. 190- 313. 
90p. cit., p. 197. My translation within parentheses; remainder from translation by Crew and 
DeSalvio (1914). 
loIbid. My translation. 
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is proportional to distance of fall) leads to a contradiction. This is all very 
much in a long tradition of the mathematical sciences from Euclid to 
Ptolemy.” 
There is no hint here that Galileo’s method is that of ex suppositione as 
recently expounded by Mertz and others. He is contrasting his own method 
with that followed by Archimedes, who, in his treatise on spiral motions, has 
supposed certain motions not found in nature. There are ambiguities in this 
discussion, but it is clear enough that Galileo is trying to present his definition 
as in some sense immediately evident.‘* He appeals to ancient custom 
in those sciences where mathematical demonstrations are applied to natural 
phenomena (conclusioni naturali), as is seen in perspective, astronomy, mechanics, 
music, and others which, with sensate esperienze, confirm theirprincipii, which then 
become the foundations of the subsequent structure.13 
This passage is often interpreted as illustrating Galileo’s adherence to the 
hypothetico-deductive-experimental method. Isn’t he, after all, confirming an 
hypothesis by deriving consequences from it and subjecting these conse- 
quences to experimental testing? What Galileo says, however, is that his 
principles @rincipi& once confirmed through sensate experience, become the 
foundation of the seguente struttura. As I have argued elsewhere, the 
fundamental principles of sciences modelled on mathematics are supposed 
established, not by experiment in the sense of confirming indirect conse- 
quences (that is, by hypothetico-deductive method), but through immediate 
experience.14 In sciences such as astronomy, the situation is more complex, as 
will be explained below. 
Galileo’s most important statements about his method in the mathematical 
sciences are in the first day of the Discorsi. These remarks are too much 
neglected by historians of his method. Here, Galileo emphasizes the necessity 
of immediate principles that are clear and evident. Sagredo is used to celebrate 
the ‘Academician’s’ lucid explanations and use of reasons, observations, and 
esperienze which are common and familiar to everyone. Indeed, demonstrative 
“Ptolemy A/mug& (trans. by R. C. Taliaferro) in Great Books ofthe Western World, Vol. 16 
(Chicago: 1652), pp. 6 - 12; also, L’Ottica di Claudia Tolomeo: da Eugenio Ammiraglio di Sicilia, 
scrittore de1 secolo XII. Ridotta in latino sovra la iraduzione araba di un test0 greco imperfetto, 
Book III (Turin: 1885), especially p. 60 - 61, paraphrased with key phrases translated in Wisan, 
‘New Science of Motion’, p. 125, n. 15. 
“‘New Science of Motion’, especially pp. 120- 125; ‘Galileo’s Scientific Method’, especially 
pp. 31-45. 
“Opere VIII, p. 212. My translation. 
9ee my ‘Galileo’s Scientific Method’, note 2, especially pp. 36 - 42. 
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science ‘springs from and grows out of principii well known, understood, and 
conceded by all’. l5 
Returning now to the introduction to the book on accelerated motion in De 
motu locali, there is no indication here that Galileo is employing the recently 
defined method of ex suppositione. The argument characterized in this way 
assumes a motion that does not exist in nature, and there is no suggestion that 
this is how Galileo himself either reasons or argues here. Quite the contrary: 
Galileo is contrasting the method he is going to use with that of Archimedes, 
and it is Archimedes’ argument that is ex suppositione. 
Now, in Book III, on projectile motion, Galileo again speaks of arguing ex 
suppositione in the Archimedean sense. Here, however, Galileo will follow the 
example of Archimedes where the latter’s suppositions have somewhat greater 
legitimacy than in the case of his spiral motions. Galileo’s suppositions are 
invoked in reply to Sagredo’s objections that the reasoning by which the 
parabolic path has been derived is ex suppositione in the pejorative sense. For 
Sagredo, that is, this reasoning, as in the case of Archimedes’ spiral motions, 
depends on assumptions that are false in nature. Some of these assumptions 
simply ignore various impediments, such as air resistance. But one is more 
fundamental: since downward motion at each point of the trajectory is 
directed toward the center of the Earth and is not, then, along parallel lines, 
the path of a projectile cannot be truly parabolic.16 
Salviati, appealing to a different text by Archimedes, fixes this last, and 
most serious, problem by supposing that projection takes place at an infinite 
distance from the center. This makes all plumb-lines parallel, and the path is 
“Opere VIII, p. 131, quoted from translation by Crew and de Salvio. In a paper ‘Galileo’s 
Method of Causal Proportionality’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 11 (1980), 229, 
Mertz suggests that what drew Galileo to mathematics was its relational character, and he opposes 
this to my suggestion that what attracted Galileo to mathematics was that logical certainty of 
results supposedly derived from true and evident principles. Now, Mertz is quite right that the 
relational character of mathematics is of dominant importance. Indeed, this is today considered its 
most fundamental characteristic. Our modern concept of mathematics, however, is quite different 
from that of the early modern period. Galileo explains his views clearly, and they are not those of 
the twentieth century Bourbaki. Moreover, his use of the methods of agreement and difference 
and of concomitant variations in his argument for the Earth’s motion from the tides has more in 
common with Bacon’s writings on method than with anything that can be found in the 
mathematics of the time. See my ‘Galileo’s Scientific Method’, cited in n. 2, above, pp. 47 - 48 
(n. 3); also, pp. 19, 49 (n. 12). 
In Mertz’ paper on ‘The Concepts of Structure in Galileo’ (cited in n. 2, above), he develops an 
historically more insightful line of analysis based on the principle that ‘the structure of a complex 
effect is isomorphic by causation with the structure of its complex cause’ (p. 124). This permits 
deeper explanation of the argument from the tides which goes beyond its Baconian structure. A 
similar reconstruction of the proof for the times-squared law does not square with Galileo’s own 
account of what he is doing. However, it is possible that some such unarticulated principle does 
reinforce Galileo’s reasoning in these passages and elsewhere, as Mertz suggests. 
16De motu locali, Book III (Opere VIII, p. 273). 
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truly parabolic. Here, again, Galileo rejects characterization of his reasoning 
(by Sagredo) as ex suppositione, and argues instead that it follows from a 
principio vero.” One may, of course, quibble over the possibility of a removal 
to infinity, but if we grant this, then one has to concede Galileo’s point. The 
motions near the Earth’s surface that he assumes, unlike those of Archimedes, 
do exist in nature, and the path of a projectile would become truly parabolic if 
launched far enough from the Earth’s center. Under this condition, his 
assumptions are true and his argument is not ex suppositione in the pejorative 
sense. 
Galileo’s critics, however, particularly in France where many results were 
disseminated before the Discorsi was published in 1638, began to question the 
truth of Galileo’s fundamental principles. In a letter of 1637, to Pierre 
Carcavi, we find Galileo forced to retreat from his contention that his 
fundamental principle, that acquired velocity is directly proportional to time 
of fall, unlike Archimedes’ assumptions in the treatise on spirals, is true in 
nature. To Carcavi, Galileo explains that: 
I argue ex suppositione, imagining for myself a motion towards a point that departs 
from rest and goes on accelerating, increasing its velocity with the same ratio as the 
time increases, and from such a motion I demonstrate conclusively lie dimostro 
concfudentementel many properties [accidenti]. I add further that if experience 
should show that such properties were found to be verified in the motion of heavy 
bodies descending naturally, we could without error affirm that this is the same 
motion I defined and supposed; and even if not, my demonstrations, founded on my 
supposition, lose nothing of their force and conclusiveness; just as nothing 
prejudices the conclusions demonstrated by Archimedes concerning the spiral that 
no moving body is found in nature that moves spirally in this way.lB [Emphasis 
added in line 7.1 
Here, at least, it is Galileo himself, not just Archimedes, who argues ex 
suppositione from a principle not fully evident in nature, and now he will wrap 
himself in the cloak of his Greek model. He proceeds to argue that the 
properties derived from his principle do, in fact, exist in nature and are 
verified by experiments. But, he hedges. Like Archimedes, Galileo argues ex 
suppositione from his definition (of naturally accelerated motion). If this turns 
out not to define that which actually occurs in nature, the demonstrations lose 
nothing just as ‘nothing prejudices the conclusions demonstrated by Archi- 
medes concerning the spiral that no moving body is found in nature that moves 
“Ibid., p. 274. 
“Opere XVII, pp. 90- 91, translation, with minor interpolations, from W. A. Wallace, op. cit., 
n. 2, above, p. 87. 
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spirally in this way’.19 Mathematically speaking, of course, it is irrelevant 
whether or not the motions assumed do actually exist in nature. 
But this is a volta face. Despite what were probably good experimental 
results by this time,” Galileo has been forced to concede that the treatise on 
accelerated motion, like that of Archimedes on spirals, may not be true of 
motions in nature. Still, it’s all good mathematics and its author could expect 
some measure of fame just from that. But (with, no doubt, an eppure under 
his breath), Galileo maintains that the motion defined does occur in nature. As 
he says elsewhere to Baliani,” he has been lucky, for the properties of the 
motions of heavy bodies do, in fact, correspond puntualmente to those 
demonstrated. 
This, however, means that it is the consequences of his principles, not the 
principles themselves, that are confirmed by his demonstration. The princi- 
ples, alas, do not meet the commonly accepted criteria as set forth in the first 
day of the Discorsi: they are not ‘well known, understood, and conceded by 
all’ (see page 232). Galileo’s critics have forced him to admit that his argument 
from the proportionality between velocity and time, in free fall, is ex 
suppositione. Very well, then, his De motu locali is still a beautiful 
mathematical treatise like those of Archimedes. 
This interpretation has been rejected by the advocates of a special apodictic 
method of arguing ex suppositione in Galileo’s writings.22 There remains, 
19Zbid. 
*“The experiment recorded on folio 116t (Galileo Manuscript 72) failed. See my paper, ‘Galileo 
and the Process of Scientific Creativity’ (forthcoming in Isis). Later results from a simpler 
experiment along an inclined plane may have been much better. See Thomas B. Settle’s very 
important paper, ‘An Experiment in the History of Science’, Science, 133 (1961), 19-23. His 
results have subsequently been corroborated by others. 
“Opere XVIII, p. 13. 
12W. A. Wallace’s discussion of reasoning ex suppositione in an appendix to his Prelude to 
Galileo (cited in n. 2, above, pp. 150 - 159), shows deep misunderstanding, both of his critics and 
of Galileo. The issue is not whether Galileo’s method was hypothetico-deductive (see both 
McMullin and myself, op. cit., n. 2, above, for arguments against this interpretation). Nor is it 
whether Galileo’s reasoning in connection with his new science of motion is lacking in ‘the cogency 
attributed to it by the author’ (Prelude, p. 150). It is whether that cogency is in any way connected 
with reasoning ex suppositione. Although Wallace admits that Galileo does not explicitly use the 
expression ex supposifione with regard to his definition of naturally accelerated motion in the De 
motu locali, he is nonetheless convinced that this is what Galileo intends. As I have argued above, 
and elsewhere, Galileo’s text indicates quite the opposite. That is, his definition is presented, not 
ex suppositione, but as true in nature. There are difficulties, of course, about just how such 
principles as the definition of naturally accelerated motion can be known to be true. The 
hypothetico-deductive method of hypothesis, deduction, and experimental verification, eventually 
gained wide acceptance as a suitable way to establish principles. But, for Galileo, indirect 
confirmation of fundamental principles was not sufficient for a mathematical science, which must 
be based on true and immediately evident principles. This, of course, was impossible. Again, see 
my paper cited in mn. 2 and 5, above. With Galileo, the mathematical sciences go well beyond the 
ancient and medieval mechanics which could be more or less grounded on such principles. 
Galileo’s new science of motion required new, non-evident principles. But, contrary to both 
Wallace and Mertz, Galileo did not employ argument ex suppositione to solve this problem. 
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however, a crucial but ignored passage which provides irrefutable evidence for 
the meaning of ex suppositione. And now we come to my third point. This 
clear and uncontrovertible instance where Galileo tells us exactly what he 
means by the disputed expression is nowhere discussed in the literature. The 
instance which shows most clearly what Galileo meant by argument ex 
suppositione appears in a draft written about 1615. In this draft, Galileo 
composed a reply to Bellarmine’s letter to Foscarini early in 1615. In his letter, 
Bellarmine said, in effect, that proponents of the Copernican system must 
cease insisting upon its acceptance by the Church. Galileo’s reply, apparently 
never sent, is published in his Opere under the title, Considerazioni circa 
l’opinione Copernicuno.23 The thrust of this document is that the Church 
should take care before condemning the Copernican system on the assumption 
that for Copernicus and his followers it is ex suppositione and not vera de 
facto.24 This, according to Galileo, would be a serious mistake. 
The Considerazioni includes an explanation of the two kinds of suppositioni 
used by astronomers. Some are prime, and these are regarded as of assoluta 
veritci in naturaz5 Others are seconde and are imagined in order to save the 
appearances. These seconde suppositioni need only satisfy appearances and 
need not be taken as re Vera in natura. 26 Ptolemy’s fundamental suppositions 
(that the heavens are spherical and move circularly, that the earth is spherical, 
immobile, and at the center of the universe) are examples given by Galileo to 
illustrate prime suppositions. These were, indeed, widely regarded as firmly 
established and absolutely true. In fact, of course, they required a good deal of 
argument, mostly in the form of reductio ad adsurdum, but they did fit 
Aristotelian physics and were simpler and more immediate than the planetary 
hypotheses, with their epicycles, equants and eccentrics, which were regarded 
as more conjectural and merely to save the appearances. As Galileo puts it, 
these latter, the planetary hypotheses, which are more conjectural, are un’altra 
sorte di suppositioni. 
For Copernicus, however, according to Galileo, the hypotheses of the 
Earth’s mobility, its motion about the Sun, and the motion of the other 
planets about the Sun, were primary, necessary, and true in nature, not simply 
postulated in order to save the appearances. We are told that, in fact, 
Copernicus, to do his calculations, returned to the old astronomy. In other 
words, the author of the Revolutionibus argued for the Sun-centered system 
solely because he believed it true in nature and not simply a convenient device 
for saving planetary hypotheses. Galileo elaborates at length on his concern 
130pere V, pp. 351- 370. 
“Opere V, p. 351. 
‘50pere V, p. 357. 
16Zbid. 
“Zbid. 
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that the Church not make the mistake of condemning the Copernican system 
on the false assumption that, for its author, it was not vera de facto but was 
made ex suppositione. 
This very important and revealing remark, however, is not on page 357, 
often cited in the literature, but on page 35 1, which is ignored or glossed over 
by those who insist that Galileo’s metodo ex suppositione achieved rigorous 
demonstration.28 Yet, it is on page 351 that we find Galileo’s clearest and most 
extensive remarks about argument ex suppositione. Such an argument, he 
say-s, is not intended to lead to factual truth, but it is based on assumptions 
made simply to save the appearances and to aid calculations. Moreover, as he 
says explicitly, it is false that, according to Copernicus and like minded 
astronomers, the stability of the Sun and the mobility of the Earth are taken ex 
suppositione simply to save the appearances and to aid calculations. On the 
contrary, they believe the Copernican system to be vera de facto and in nature. 
Galileo, of course, agrees entirely with this position. In the Dialogue, however, 
Simplicio does not. When he speaks of Salviati’s argument as exsuppositione, 
he means that it follows from a false hypothesis and not from a supposition 
that is true in nature. 
In conclusion, then, there is no evidence for, and there is much evidence 
against, the supposition that Galileo had an apodictic method of arguing ex 
suppositione, which he employed in his mature work. Simplicio’s remark in 
the Dialogue, quoted at the beginning of this paper, must be taken to mean 
what it appears to mean, nothing more. He did not understand the new 
astronomy, but, given his assumptions, one must grant that even Simplicio 
could spot an argument ex suppositione falsa. 
‘8Mertz nowhere cites this occurrence of ex suppositione in the Consideruzioni, while Wallace 
insists that Galileo is here distinguishing between two different meanings of the expression. See 
Prelude to Galileo, cited in n. 2, above, p. 139- 140. This is a misreading of the text. Galileo 
distinguishes between two different meanings of the common term, suppositione (that is, prime 
and seconde, p. 235, but he has only one meaning for argument ex suppositione, and this is that 
such an argument is from a supposition not known to be true. 
On the page in Considerazioni that Wallace misreads (page 351) Galileo sets out to correct two 
concetti which are false (diversi dul vero). The first is that stability of the Earth and mobility of the 
sun are indubitable truths and that the contrary view is paradoxical and stupid. The second is that 
for Copernicus and his followers the Sun-centered system has been set forth ex suppositione, 
merely to save appearances and aid calculations. Galileo’s only other use of the expression ex 
suppositione in the Considerazioni (p. 360) again refers to the erroneous belief of many that 
‘modern astronomers’ (the Copernicans) introduced the motion of the Earth ex suppositione in 
order to save appearances. The Consideruzioni ends with arguments that Copernicus was not the 
author of the preface to De revolutionibus, and that Copernicus himself believed the sun-centered 
system to be the true system. 
